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included a short presentation of the argument forms modus (ponendo) ponens, modus (tollendo) tollens, modus ponendo tollens, and modus tollendo ponens: (For brevity, I shall call arguments of these four types 'modus ponens type arguments'.)
In late antiquity, arguments of the ponens and tollens forms were generally classified as 'hypothetical syllogisms' (aiXXoytagoi IoOEttuKoi, syllogismi hypothetici), and they were regarded as valid by virtue of these forms. However, as far as we know, Aristotle did not discuss such arguments, nor did he call any arguments 'hypothetical syllogisms'.4 The Stoics, on the other hand, distinguished certain kinds of arguments that closely resemble modus ponens type argument. But they, too, did not call these arguments 'hypothetical syllogisms';5 nor did they describe them as I There are modifications of the two disjunctive forms in later ancient texts, with which however I am not concerned in this paper. The modifications cover disjunctions that are not exclusive and exhaustive and disjunctions with more than two disjuncts. I consider the later development of these types of arguments in my 'Hypothetical syllogistic in Galen: propositional logic off the rails?' (forthcoming).
Importantly, in our sources the distinction between categorical and hypothetical syllogisms is generally presented as derivative of a distinction between categorical and hypothetical propositions. Categorical propositions state that something is the case (or holds or belongs) or that something is not the case (or does not hold or not belong); examples are 'some stones are not white', 'Socrates is walking'. Their name is presumably based on the fact that in them something is predicated (iccxTyopeiaat) of something." I Hypothetical propositions encompass at least conditional propositions (such as 'if it is day, it is light') and various types of disjunctive propositions (e.g. 'either it is day or it is night'). Hypothetical propositions were thought to have two or more categorical propositions as their components (cf. Boeth. Hyp.syll. For the following, two features of this later ancient syllogistic in particular should be kept in mind: First, that in these sources of later antiquity the term 'hypothetical' in the expression 'hypothetical proposition' denotes a property of the proposition which it has in virtue of its form and independently of its use or function in the argumentational context. (The same holds of the term 'categorical' in the expression 'categorical proposition'.) Second, that the naming of certain syllogisms as 'categorical' or 'hypothetical syllogisms' was thought to be derivative of the fact that they contain categorical or hypothetical propositions.
This later ancient classification of categorical and hypothetical syllogisms may appear straightforward and well thought out. However there are a couple of things that are odd with it. * Just as to us today the word 'hypothetical' suggests an element of conditionality or of supposition, so did the word bno0e?tick to the speakers of Greek in antiquity. So why were propositions of the kind 'either p or q' called 'hypothetical', and -by derivation -why were syllogisms e.g. of the form tollendo ponens called 'hypothetical syllogisms'?'6 * If one thinks that the characteristic of 'mixed' arguments is given by the premiss that is a complex proposition, e.g. 'if p, q', or 'either p or are not connectives; the use of specific connectives for specific types of hypothetical propositions is not necessary; term logic creeps in at unexpected places; and simple conjunctions are not classified as hypothetical propositions. '3 I use the expression 'propositional logic' in the very loose sense of a logic that is concerned with the relations between whole propositions. I also do not consider here the question whether the name 'sentence logic' would be more apposite, but use the tern 'proposition' simply to refer to the primary truth-bearers of the theories. In the reductions to the impossible, the conclusion is not proved through a syllogism, or syllogized, but is concluded from a hypothesis (or concluded or proved through the impossible, An.Pr. 5Oa29-32, 61a34-5, 62b38-40). It is concluded from a hypothesis because without hypothesizing the contradictory of the demonstrandum, one would never get to the (impossible) conclusion, hence never to the falsehood of the contradictory of the demonstrandum, hence never to the demonstrandum. Thus the demonstrandum is concluded from a hypothesis, viz. by means of an act I 'They' refers to the syllogisms from an hypothesis. However, here, as elsewhere, And in book 1 of the Topics:
<The examination of likeness is useful> for syllogisms from a hypothesis, since it is an accepted view that among similars, however things are with one, so they are with the rest. Hence if regarding any of them we are well-equipped to argue about them, we will make an advance agreement that however things are in these cases, so they are with the point at issue; and when we have proved the former, we will also have proved from a hypothesis the point at issue. For we have hypothesized that however things are in these cases, so they are with the point at issue, and have then provided the proof. (Top. 108bl2-19)
And in book 3:
Further from a hypothesis: you should claim that if it holds of one or does not hold of one, then it does so in the same way to all; for instance, if the soul of human beings is immortal, so are the other souls, and if it is not, nor are the others. If then it is posited that it holds of something, it should be proved that it does not hold of something; for it will follow because of the hypothesis that it holds of nothing. And if it is posited that it does not hold of something, then it should be proved that it does hold of something; for in this way it will follow that it holds of all. (Top. 119b35-120a2)
Aristotle uses 'syllogism' in order to denote the conclusion of a syllogistic argument, i.e. the conclusion qua being the result of a deduction or valid inference. 27 Reading toiro rather than toibTov. If one reads toirov, this would have to refer to a syllogism from an hypothesis, again, intended as the conclusion of such an argument (see previous note). 28 31 At An.Pr. 41a37-41, Aristotle takes the agreement (obVokoyia) as a kind of hypothesis, whereas elsewhere, the hypothesis is distinguished from the agreement or contract (oavv% ). This difficulty could be dissolved by assuming that Aristotle distinguished the act of making the agreement or of hypothesizing from the agreement or hypothesis as that which has agreed upon or hypothesized, i.e. as the product of the act, but did not use a consistent terminology. understood to back up a statement of the kind 'if p is proved, q must be accepted', and (ii) that it should be plausible (nt0avO;, Top. 1 10a37). The latter point is self-evident, since otherwise one will hardly get one's interlocutor to agree to it. The reason why these hypotheses are called hypotheses is, again, their function in the logical discourse: they are hypothesized or supposed, i.e. assumed and agreed upon by the interlocutors (without further justification or proof), for the purpose of establishing (or refuting) something. Unlike the hypothetical propositions of later antiquity, they are not called hypotheses because they are a type of proposition of a particular form, say of conditional form. * The newly introduced proposition (p) is called 'that which is taken instead' (To ertakactiavo6,tevov, An.Pr. 41a39, 45b18). For it is a substitute that is 'taken instead of' the original demonstrandum (q). Instead of the latter, it is it which is going to be proved syllogistically (An.Pr. 45b15-19; 41a38-40). * The substituted proposition (p) is then proved by a term-logical syllogism, say 'r; s; therefore p'. * But then, according to the advance agreement, and based on the hypothesis, q, too, has been proved -although only from a hypothesis.
Thus an Aristotelian syllogism from a hypothesis is a combination of (i) a term-logical syllogism and (ii) the agreement which -somehow -is based on a hypothesis, relying on which the partners of the agreement get from the conclusion of the term-logical syllogism to the original demonstrandum. Note that the 'form' of the meta-linguistic agreement and its 'cashing in' taken together display a certain similarity to modus ponendo ponens. This is important for what follows. It is instructive to ask why these Aristotelian arguments were called 'syllogisms from a hypothesis'. Aristotle does not tell us, so we have to infer the answer from the passages in which he mentions or discusses them. These passages suggest that syllogisms from a hypothesis were called 'syllogisms' because they include a term-logical, or 'probative', syllogism, as Aristotle calls them in this context: In An.Pr. (41a37-41b1) we read '. . . For in each <syllogism from a hypothesis> the syllogism is directed towards that which is taken instead, but the original demonstrandum is inferred by means of an agreement or some other hypothesis.' The probative syllogism contained in the syllogism from a hypothesis is here referred to as 'the syllogism': the definite article can only mean that there is exactly one syllogism (proper) involved in a syllogism from a hypothesis, and that this (the probative syllogism) is it. above, p has been inferred from a syllogism, and q can then be inferredfrom-a-hypothesis.) This hypothesis is not part of any syllogism proper. It is part of an agreement, and only the partners of the agreement are bound to accept the demonstrandum. We cannot say that the demonstrandum, say q, has been syllogized (or deduced, avXoyiteaOat) full-stop. Even when p (that which is taken instead) has been proved, we can at most say that q has been proved on the agreement that if p is proved, q is proved. The partners of the agreement are bound to accept q not because of the truth of the hypothesis, but because they entered into the agreement.36 32 A syllogism from a hypothesis thus understood would presumably not qualify as a syllogism according to Aristotle's definition of the syllogism (An.Pr. 24b18-20, Top. 100a25-7), because its conclusion does not follow from necessity. The clause 'it is necessary to accept <the demonstrandum>' in An.Pr. 50a24-5 means 'necessary relative to having agreed to the hypothesis'. 33 So also Alexander at An.Pr. 42.27-31: '<Aristotle> discusses only categorical syllogisms, because he thinks that only these are syllogisms in the strict sense ... For he thinks that no syllogism from a hypothesis syllogizes the point at issue.' 34 Since Aristotle uses aoXXoytogos6 not only to refer to the entire compound of premisses and conclusion, but also to the result of the syllogizing, i.e. to the conclusion only (see also above n. 26), we may assume that the conclusion of a syllogizingfrom-a-hypothesis (a syllogism from a hypothesis) is syllogized-from-a-hypothesis (a syllogism from a hypothesis). 3S The name 'syllogism' is borrowed from the probative syllogism it includes, and can be borne only with the qualifying phrase 'from a hypothesis'; in other words, the phrase 'from a hypothesis' functions as a restrictive qualifier.
36 Can q be 'detached' from the hypothesis? The dialectical game can only be won if q is accepted 'on its own', as it were. And the agreement is, I take it, an agreement to that effect. Once p is proved, q must (and hence can) be accepted on its own. Within the game of dialectic, at its end, q is free-standing. This does not, however, change the fact that only those who entered in the agreement are bound to accept q, and in that sense, q is and remains dependent on the agreement.
A syllogism from a hypothesis is thus an argument in which the demonstrandum is not directly the conclusion of a probative syllogism, and is hence not (properly) deduced (auXoyi4esOat), but is inferred indirectly via an agreed hypothesis, which connects the demonstrandum with another proposition which in turn is (properly) deduced. Thus Aristotle's other syllogisms from a hypothesis -whatever else they may be -are certainly not arguments that are valid because of their logical form; nor were they regarded as such.
Aristotle: two passages from the Topics
Of equal importance for the development of modus ponens type arguments are a couple of passages from Aristotle's Topics in which he presents some specific topoi.37 Here is the first passage:
One must examine, regarding the point at issue, [i] what is such that if it is, the point at issue is, or [ii] what is by necessity, if the point at issue is: [i] if one wants to establish something, one must examine what there is such that if it is, the point at issue will be (for when the forner has been proved to hold, the point at issue will also have been proved to hold); [ii] if, on the other hand, one wants to refute something, one must examine what it is that is if the point at issue is (for when we prove that what follows from the point at issue is not, we will have
destroyed the point at issue.) (Top. 11.4 11 lb 17-23)
In this passage, a relation of consequence is used in two ways: first, a relation of consequence between something a and the point at issue b is used to establish b via a; second, a relation of consequence between the point at issue b and some other thing a is used to refute b (or to establish not-b) via not-a. It is unclear here, whether the point at issue (a) and the other thing (b) are two terms/predicates, or whether they are whole sentences/states of affairs.38 I believe it more likely that Aristotle had terms in mind. In that case, 'if a is, b is' is short for something like 'if a holds 37 The importance of these passages has been recently correctly emphasized by Slomkowski 1997. I disagree, though, with his main thesis that Aristotle himself discussed hypothetical syllogisms of type modus ponens. 38 Aristotle uses the relation of consequence (acicoXoIuiOqt, aicokouOciv, -o KOcXo1)Oov) both between terms and between whole sentences; the term 'thing at issue' (lpoKeiFEvov) is mostly used for terms, but possibly sometimes (e.g. at Top. 120alO) for whole sentences or states of affairs.
(i.e. of a certain thing), b holds (i.e. of that thing)'. The second passage follows shortly after the first:
In the case of things of which hold one and only one of two <predicates>, as for instance of a human being holds either illness or health, if we are well-equipped to argue about the one, that it holds or does not hold, we will also be wellequipped with regard to the remaining one; this converts with regard to both; for [iii] when we have proved that the one <predicate> holds, we will also have proved that the other does not hold; and [iv] when we prove that the one does not hold, we will have proved that the remaining one holds. In Aristotle's extant writings the topoi of these two passages are not given a special status, but are just some among many. Moreover, Aristotle nowhere directly draws the connection between these topoi and his arguments from a hypothesis. It is however possible to present arguments that exemplify these topoi in the form of syllogisms from a hypothesis, and not unlikely that this had been done in the Peripatos at Aristotle's time. In any case, I will do it now.
First, in place of the meta-logical hypothetical agreement of the type 'If that which is taken instead is proved, the demonstrandum will be accepted' the two Topics passages provide the four variant types of such agreements which one obtains when (in addition to the establishings) one also considers the refutations (or the negations)40 of the demonstrandum and of 39 Alexander's commentary on these passages from Aristotle's Topics testifies that these Aristotelian topoi were later interpreted as being the ancestor arguments of our quartet of modus ponens type arguments. Thus, Alexander explicitly draws the connection to the first two Stoic indemonstrables with topoi of the first passage, and the last two Stoic indemonstrables with the topos of the second passage (Alex. Top. 165.5-166.13, 174.5-175.26).
4 We can assume that Aristotle considered a refutation of p as (materially) equivalent to a proof of not-p. This however does not imply that he thought they were the same thing. 
holds (of c). (demonstrandum) B If a holds (of something), b holds (of it). (hypothesis) C If it is proved that a holds (of c), it is proved that b holds (of c). (agreement) D It is proved that a holds (of c). (by a probative syllogism that is part of the syllogism from hypothesis) E It is proved that b holds (of c).
(by hypothesis) 42 The formulations I suggest are meant to give no more than the general idea how the above listed Aristotelian topoi could have provided four kinds of syllogism from a hypothesis.
4' Or alternatively as: (1") If it is established that a holds, then it is established that h holds. (2") If is refuted that a holds, then it is refuted that b holds. (3") If it is established that a holds, then it is refuted that b holds. (4") If it is refuted that a holds, then it is established that h holds.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODUS PONENS IN ANTIQUITY
(2"') A It is to be proved that b does not hold (of c). (demonstrandum) B If b holds (of something), a holds (of it). (hypothesis) C If it is proved that a doesn't hold (of c), it is proved that b doesn't hold (of c). (agreement) D It is proved that a does not hold (of c). (by a probative syllogism) E It is proved that b does not hold (of c). (by hypothesis) (3"') A It is to be proved that b holds (of c). (demonstrandum) B Either a or b holds (of something). (hypothesis) C If it is proved that a does not hold (of c), it is proved that b holds (of c). (agreement) D It is proved that a does not hold (of c). (by a probative syllogism) E It is proved that b holds (of c). (by hypothesis) (4"') A It is to be proved that b holds (of c). (demonstrandum) B Either a or b holds (of something). (hypothesis) C If it is proved that a holds (of c), it is proved that b does not hold (of c). (agreement) D It is proved that a holds (of c). (by a probative syllogism) E It is proved that b does not hold (of c). (by hypothesis)
Note that in all four cases, modus ponendo ponens is used as a kind of In terms of Diagram 5 above, we can express this by saying that the relations between a and b that underlie the four types of agreements (and make it possible that when the statement in the antecedent is proved, so is the statement in the consequent), were considered as a relation of 'connection' between things in cases (1"') and (2"'), and as a relation of separation or division of things in cases (3"') and (4"'); and that the relation of connection was eventually (perhaps with Eudemus, perhaps only later) expressed in conditional statements, that of separation in some kind of disjunctive statements, in the following way: This further development was facilitated, and perhaps blurred, by the fact that in Peripatetic logic the word npotacrt; was used both for 'premiss' and for 'proposition'. I now take the two steps of the development in order. 
From hypothesis to
